Netanyahu’s capitalist government of death has succeeded in avoiding early elections. This occurred despite a catastrophic, historic war crisis; despite mass protest movements that even involved general protest strikes; despite an ongoing international protest movement against the mass atrocities this government is perpetrating; and despite the fact that throughout its existence it relied on direct support from a minority of the public in the State of Israel.
The substantive reason for this is not the narrow technical majority that the ruling coalition had in the Knesset. Despite a multitude of caveats in recent years, the substantive reason for the survival of Netanyahu’s rule is a sweeping mobilisation of the entire Israeli ruling class, with its parties and the establishment press, for ongoing, foundational support for the military campaign of Netanyahu’s rule against the Palestinian people and for shifting the regional balance of power in the benefit of the occupation and Israeli capitalism.
At a fundamental level, this also reflects the lack of a strong political challenge from the left in society, from organised labour and in the form of left-wing parties with roots in the working class, that would offer an exit from the systemic crises. Accordingly, the right-wing, pro-capitalist leadership in the Histadrut also mobilised to support the war of annihilation in Gaza, the regional bombings, and also the economic attacks on the working class in Israel to fund the war machine.
Now, ahead of the Knesset elections set for 27 October, establishment parties from the camp opposing Netanyahu, after having mobilised time and again in decisive support of the war while reciting that on such questions ‘there is no coalition and no opposition’, present themselves as an alternative in power. They are riding the immense mass disgust at various aspects of the consequences of the ‘full-on right-wing’ government’s policies in order to recycle the idea of a solution in the form of a ‘government of change’ — in the sense of a governmental coalition that Netanyahu does not head and in which the ultra-Orthodox parties and the far-right parties of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich will not be included.
Under Pressure, Netanyahu’s Bloc Jockeys to Stay in Power
Since the beginning of 2026, Netanyahu’s bloc has consistently floundered in poll averages around 50–53 seats — equivalent to slightly more than 40% of the vote. Support for most of the prospective slates has remained fairly stable, with the exception of the surge of the centre-right slate of former Chief of Staff Eisenkot at the expense of the centre-right slate of Bennett and Lapid.
On the face of it, Netanyahu’s bloc has no prospect of securing an absolute majority at the ballot box in the upcoming elections. Although even in the 2022 elections the majority it achieved was not absolute, it is currently roughly a quarter of a million votes short of even a narrow parliamentary majority. It may continue to gamble on new measures of military escalation, insofar as it is able, in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, in an attempt to exploit moments in Israeli society of mass shock and peak impact of security demagogy to influence the election dynamics — at the expense of the lives and security of all the peoples of the region, and ultimately also of the residents of Israel. However, the electoral potential of this avenue for the bloc at the present stage, whilst existent, remains quite low, as illustrated during the recent phases of military escalation. Such a scenario could lead, among other things, to the military re-imposing restrictions on public gatherings, serving to suppress voting de facto by creating more complex conditions for reaching the polling station, and, under extreme conditions, entailing a postponement of the election date.
Another avenue, perfected by the Netanyahu bloc over the years with varying degrees of cooperation from some of the Zionist opposition parties, is the delegitimisation of the Arab-Palestinian vote in order to distort the electoral picture among the general public, and to drive turnout among part of the Jewish population on the basis of nationalist scaremongering. The outgoing government may well return to concocting new nationalist spins against the Arab-Palestinian public in Israel, combined with efforts to disqualify candidates and slates from running, pressure to open criminal investigations for ‘incitement’, and threatening, violent persecution aimed at deterring Arab voters on election day.
Insofar as the Netanyahu bloc can thwart the possibility of a parliamentary majority for the rival capitalist bloc, it may succeed in reproducing a scenario of extending the tenure of the outgoing government — as a ‘transition government’ — through prolonged periods of negotiations and a resort to repeat elections.
An option that at this stage appears unlikely is that Netanyahu will decide to extricate himself from the impasse in the electoral balance of forces by stepping down on the eve of the elections, for instance as part of a deal regarding his dragging corruption trial. Such a scenario could, in the short term, lend flexibility to his party’s position by fostering a superficial impression of a leadership change — bolstered significantly by the ideological fallout from years of shallow personal propaganda from his rivals in the ‘Anything-but-Bibi’ camp within the Israeli establishment — but would also cause a major upheaval in a party that has increasingly taken shape as an instrument subservient to his authority. However, such a scenario of a docile resignation on the eve of the elections would threaten to seal an image of ‘total defeat’ for the Netanyahu bloc, making it less likely, as noted, prior to election day.
The Establishment’s ‘Change Bloc’ and the Comeback Danger
The Socialist Struggle Movement has consistently taken part over recent years in struggles against the capitalist government of death, as well as against the war of extermination and the ‘forever war’. We have called to advance a struggle to restrict the steps of the government and bring it down, and even now we share the sense of urgency felt by a broad public, spanning national communities, that every opportunity must be seized to defeat the rule of Netanyahu and the far right.
However, while a defeat for Netanyahu in the upcoming elections is certainly a desirable scenario in itself — much like the results of the 2021 elections and the formation of the Bennett–Lapid government, this is not enough to block the grave danger of a comeback by an even more aggressive right-wing coalition. The ‘Anything-but-Bibi’ status-quo government of 2021–2022 paved the way back then for the aggressive comeback of the Netanyahu bloc and the far right, and for rivers of blood.
A large section of the Israeli establishment currently favours promises of ‘change’ and ‘repair’. To be sure, as far as they are concerned, a consensus exists around the military campaign and austerity measures to fund the war machine, owing to interests in fortifying regional hegemony, tightening mechanisms of control over the Palestinian people, and fundamentally in defending the power structure of the rule of capital. However, for the mainstream of the Israeli ruling class, the Netanyahu bloc has become a significant political liability at both local and international levels. They criticise Netanyahu for conducting the war inefficiently in their view, influenced by personal interests (including against the backdrop of his corruption trial) and alliances with the far-right and Ultra-Orthodox right-wing parties, as well as for turning in an ‘authoritarian’ direction at the expense of stability in Israeli society, international relations, and the interests of capital. They seek to replace him as a move toward systemic stabilisation and a supposedly more efficient management of the war crisis and the totality of crises in Israeli society. In doing so, they remain ultimately committed to continuing fundamental aspects of the path of Netanyahu’s rule. It is important to learn the lessons of the previous ‘government of change’.
It would be a mistake to believe those parties claiming that the Bennett–Lapid government at the time ‘did not have enough time to work’. From day one, the government of Netanyahu and the far right displayed a sense of urgency in the concentrated implementation of a ‘full-on right-wing’ agenda, through the execution of counter-reforms aimed at advancing a grab of state power, most notably in the form of the ‘judicial coup’ plan, and accelerating moves to deepen the occupation and dispossession of the Palestinians. By contrast, the Bennett–Lapid government operated openly and explicitly to preserve the status quo, including the toxic legacy of Netanyahu’s governments, alongside processes of privatisation and the discriminatory ‘Nationality Law’. Its purpose was the perpetuation of the status quo of occupation, national dispossession, and the rule of capital — thereby playing its part in preparing the ground for the current ongoing war crisis. It left space for the Israeli far right to reorganise and masquerade as a ‘tougher’ alternative for rescuing Israeli society from ‘security’ crises.
The bloc of establishment parties opposed to Netanyahu relies primarily on a ‘lesser evil’ vote rather than positive popularity for political programmes, as they possess no thoroughly alternative fundamental plans to the path of the government of death; and although they attempt to play sloganistically on mass disgust with the ceaseless war and the cost of living, they fail to generate mass enthusiasm. Thus, despite the catastrophe of recent years, they struggle in polls to secure 61 seats on their own to form a majority coalition in the Knesset, although according to some polls this remains a possibility. Out of considerations of Zionist nationalism, they would prefer not to rely once again on the affiliation of the right-wing Islamist Raʿam party (‘United Arab List’ — not to be confused with the ‘Joint List’), led by Manṣour ʿAbbas, that is rooted in the Arab-Palestinian Bedouin community.
ʿAbbas’s party continues to prepare itself as an instrument to rescue the bourgeois-Zionist ‘coalition of change’, striving to scrape together budgetary crumbs on a sectoral basis while integrating into the status quo. However, because the ‘coalition of change’ this time — under the influence of the parties’ role in the war crisis — is saturated in advance even more blatantly with chauvinistic messaging and attempts to outflank Netanyahu from the right, it is once again refuelling the idea of a government relying on a ‘Zionist majority’ — that is, without the Ultra-Orthodox parties (which represent non-Zionist and semi-Zionist factions) upon which Netanyahu relies, and above all, as Bennett announced, without reliance on ‘Arab parties’. It is possible that the capitalist generals’ alliance of the ‘Anything-but-Bibi’ camp will attempt to manage ‘without Arab parties’, by relying on a hypothetical alignment with Likud defector factions, or, less plausibly, even with Likud itself.
‘The Democrats’, led by former Deputy Chief of Staff Yair Golan, aspire to be a fifth wheel in a ‘change government 2’ on the basis of votes from strata that lean to some extent leftward, who see no genuine political alternative in the pro-capitalist, militaristic, and settler centre-right politics of Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, and Lieberman. This is indeed no genuine political alternative. Nevertheless, in a ‘change government 2’ scenario, the dominance of this politics is guaranteed in advance, complete with a ‘democratic’ fig leaf. Golan and other leaders of ‘The Democrats’, such as MK Naama Lazimi — who takes care to cultivate a ‘social-democratic’ image — have provided explicit support for the war over recent years, endorsing specific actions of bombardments and conquests. The political alternative that The Democrats offer to the path of Netanyahu’s government is the leveraging of ‘military achievements’, in their words, into ‘diplomatic agreements’, as well as drafting the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish youth into the army to share the burden of maintaining the machine of occupation, alongside slogans on the margins regarding ‘democracy’ and a ‘welfare state’. Within the framework of a ‘change government 2’, they hope to have manoeuvring space to advance cosmetic changes in legislation and push policies for maintaining occupation, the rule of capital, and imperialism ‘with a more human face’.
Support for an Alternative Capitalist Occupation Government as a ‘Lesser Evil’?
The blinding logic of ‘lesser-evilism’ will immediately cry out: ‘This is better than Ben-Gvir! And there is no choice!’ Of course, after all ‘anything’ is preferable to further power for the far right. But this does not mean that ‘anything’ is a genuine political alternative, nor that political support should be expressed for an ‘anything’ government — which will solve nothing in essential terms, and upon which the far right will be able to stoke anger over its lack of a serious response to security concerns and burning social problems.
A broad public will vote in order to get rid of the rule of Netanyahu and the far right. Insofar as this objective is indeed achieved in the upcoming elections, many, across communities, will rightly feel a measure of relief, and there will surely be those who even celebrate the eventual realisation of inflicting a defeat on the ‘full-on right-wing’ government.
To be sure, the possibility of a left-wing government coming to power is not on the cards in the upcoming elections; rather, a centre-right ‘change government 2’ based on the political bloc opposing Netanyahu within the establishment — another head of the same system of war, occupation, and the rule of capital. Yet such a government, which will paint itself as a ‘government of change’, will be subject to heightened pressure to yield certain concessions to the mass struggles of recent years, and on account of the effort to harness support from masses thirsty for ‘change’ after four catastrophic years.
However, such concessions will not be a root-and-branch response to the problems of war and occupation, the cost of living, and community violence, but primarily a display of ‘change’ on the legal plane. For instance, a state commission of inquiry, some repeal of ‘authoritarian’ legislation, and, in this context, perhaps also attempts at symbolic legislative measures to limit a prime minister’s term of office. It is also likely that minimal budgets effectively frozen for Arab local authorities will be released, particularly for programmes to eradicate violence in the community.
But the scope of concessions the government will be pushed to make depends essentially also on the scope of new struggles that develop. Thus, it is necessary to raise warning signs and prepare for struggles against the new capitalist occupation government, which will not be a popular government. It will be a government inheriting an ‘unsettled’ war crisis and trends of economic crisis, and will continue to promote policy measures based on the logic of occupation, the ‘Judaisation’ of territory (ethnic cleansing), and the rule of capital.
Thus, it is probable that such a government will not swiftly — if at all! — withdraw all occupation forces deployed by order of Netanyahu’s government of death in the Gaza Strip, South Lebanon, and Southern Syria. What is more, it will continue to foster settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and advance home demolitions, as occurred under ‘change government 1′. Even the claim made by Bennett — former CEO of the colonialist Yesha Council — that colonial outposts lacking government authorization will be evacuated will hold no water on any meaningful scale without heavy pressure building on such a government to enter into a head-on confrontation with settler organisations. Without intense social pressure generated through struggle, such a government will continue to drain resources from hospitals, promote the systematic underfunding of social services in general, fuel housing distress stemming from a scandalous dependence on the private market, and launch attacks on workers’ wages across the economy to finance the machine of occupation and war.
The leadership of the Histadrut and a multitude of political elements backing ‘change government 2’ — including capitalist and militarist establishment figures who integrated into the leadership of the Israeli movement against the ‘judicial coup’ plan or the movement for the return of the hostages and a commission of inquiry — will likely promote a degree of restraint on public protests and workers’ struggles to ‘allow the government to work’. Yet, the burning issues of war, occupation, and socio-economic crisis will arouse mass dissatisfaction. This will drive sections of the working class and middle strata towards demands for change and onto paths of struggle against the government, the state, and private employers.
Although pressure will be exerted on such a government to refrain from intensifying political persecution to the levels seen in recent years under Netanyahu’s rule, struggles will continue to face incitement, persecution, and police repression. Simultaneously, the threat posed by the ousted Likud camp and the far right will continue to include physical attacks in the public sphere, alongside systematic efforts to exploit ‘security’ and social crises to regain public support by masquerading as an ‘alternative’ from the right.
The ‘Joint List’
To substantively undermine the space for the far right to grow, it is essential to insist on a political programme for root-and-branch solutions to the crises in society. It is necessary to insist on laying down in advance an alternative path of left opposition, offering a horizon for building forces towards a future where a genuine ‘left government’ becomes feasible — rather than choosing between two evils by opting to cast a ‘strategic’ vote, which merely advances the ‘least bad’ combination in the next Knesset time and time again.
At this stage, it appears the ‘Joint List’ will not be reconstituted as a Palestinian national list comprising the four main parties based in the Arab-Palestinian public in Israel, primarily after Raʿam decided to reject the proposal and focus on a campaign to join a ‘change government 2’. Initially, Raʿam demanded the other parties agree to a ‘technical bloc’ that would allow it to join a governing coalition immediately after the elections. When met with a positive response, it went on to demand a written commitment that the other components of the ‘Joint List’ would neither oppose nor criticise the government Raʿam would join. The rope was stretched too far, and snapped.
Polls predicted that a hypothetical list of the four parties would replicate its peak strength from the 2020 elections — 15 seats — or even surpass it, serving as an indirect expression of a deep thirst for change. However, as we warned at the time, and as the track record of the ‘Joint List’ has proven over the years of its existence, even the success of sweeping up the votes of hundreds of thousands, expressing a protest against the status quo, is incapable in itself of serving as a tangible step forward in the struggle for change.
What is required is a foundational political platform that embodies both the democratic struggle of the Arab-Palestinian public against national discrimination and oppression, and a broad campaign for a profound change in the reality of life, anchored in the interests of the wider working class, cutting across national and ethnic lines. Also required is a plan of action tied to an orientation of breaking out of political isolation and altering the balance of forces against right-wing rule.
The guiding logic of the ‘Joint List’ leaders seeks to preserve an electoral bloc between right-leaning forces with a pro-capitalist agenda — including, in the case of Raʿam (which officially is still invited to join the list), a conservative right wing that endorses attacks on women and LGBTQ+ people — and left-wing forces advancing policies in favour of the working class and oppressed communities, by way of a compromise based on a minimal national-democratic platform. Such a logic is incapable of generating a substantive vision, including one that could, over time, gain a hearing and potential support from exploited and oppressed strata within the Israeli public, who, feeling they have ‘no choice’, are led astray by the establishment parties.
However, now that Raʿam has made it clear it will run separately, a new opportunity has emerged for the left-wing component in the potential ‘Joint List’, in the form of Ḥadash/al-Jabha, to insist — even if a ‘technical bloc’ is formed — on advancing an independent, bilingual, high-visibility left-wing campaign, one that will not merely attempt to spur supporters to go out and vote. Rather, it must be a campaign that seeks to step into the vacuum on the left and vie for the attention of strata of ordinary working-class people who feel no party gives them a voice, and who thirst for a cross-community struggle for profound change against the forever war, the occupation, the cost of living, and the rule of capital, as well as against attacks on democratic freedoms, on women, and on LGBTQ+ people.
What Needs Strengthening is Not a Centre-Right Government
Although ‘The Democrats’ — a liberal reincarnation of the remnants of the Labor and Meretz parties — is unmistakably one of the parties of war, occupation, and the rule of capital, there are also left-leaning strata that identify it under current circumstances as a political alternative, including a certain segment of the Arab-Palestinian population. Reports of over 100,000 people registering as party members, while directly linked to internal candidate selection through primary elections, do not in this case indicate the public or electoral weight of a ‘ruling party’ as the party itself claims, nor the extent of involvement in active branches. Yet it is indeed an indication of some degree of renewed dynamism within ‘centre-left’ circles, under the impact of the protest movements against the ‘full-on right-wing’ government.
In this context, there are left-wing circles now seeking to support the party and ‘influence it’. This includes social-democratic activists involved in the apparatus of the Power to the Workers independent union federation and the small trade-union organisation Maʿan, as well as an initiative defining itself as Democrats Against the Occupation, alongside a section of activists and supporters from the Standing Together movement.
From the standpoint of consistent opposition to the occupation as well as to the rule of capital, involvement in a party that supports military occupations and pro-capitalist policies is a waste of time, in that — under the guise of promoting a left alternative — it harnesses left-leaning strata to actively support a dangerous and destructive agenda, at the expense of efforts to build a genuine political alternative on the left. These attempts reflect, above all, political pessimism in the face of the chauvinist reaction in Israeli society under the shadow of the war years, and at a time when there is currently no indication of a left-wing pole of attraction with a mass base.
Within the Standing Together movement, a debate developed regarding the possibility of launching a list in the upcoming elections. Ultimately, several members of its leadership presented their movement with a fait accompli through the official launch of a new party — ‘A Place for Us All’ (Makom LeKulanu / LeKolna Makan) — which organisationally and formally is considered a separate entity, and appears in practice not to be under the democratic control of the founding movement’s bodies. Despite considerable expenditure on an advertising budget, the launch generated no real echo in the establishment media — which, for its part, certainly does not help to provide an outlet for political voices on the left— at a moment when neither the movement nor the list arrives at the current juncture as a point of reference in mass public consciousness. This is the product both of objective limitations beyond their control and of weaknesses in orientation and political strategy for change, particularly as Standing Together was built as a broad tent for left-leaning strata, whose supporters are divided mainly between supporting ‘The Democrats’ and supporting Ḥadash/al-Jabha and the Joint List. In view of a level of support significantly lower than the organisers anticipated, and based on a prior declaration of intent, it is probable that the list will withdraw from running independently before election day.
However, the very idea of establishing a new left-wing party cutting across national communities signals a genuine political vacuum. It would be positive if this tentative attempt is not quietly folded away due to internal controversy and the failure to gain public attention, but is instead directed towards utilising the election period for a campaign aimed at winning a hearing in Hebrew and Arabic among ordinary working-class people and young people. This would be aimed at serving as an early precursor or stepping stone towards advancing the major task of building a broad party of struggle that can fill the political void in representing the interests, plight, and struggles of workers, youth, and oppressed communities, on a foundation entirely independent of the nationalist capitalist establishment. Justifiably, the organisers argued, against fears of ‘wasted votes’ on the left, that a new left-wing party is potentially capable of drawing votes even from a stratum that would otherwise not bother going to the polls.
Immediate demands promoted by the campaign, such as ‘withdraw the army from Gaza and Lebanon’, ‘free education from age 0’, and ‘minimum wage of 50 NIS per hour’, are positive in themselves, and it would be useful if the campaign succeeds in further popularising them. However, in line with the trend expressed by the founding movement, when it comes to a political platform presenting root-and-branch solutions, the political line is characterised by the vagueness of left populism and remains sloganistic. Thus far, it does not substantively depart from an occasional campaign of the former Meretz.
Among other things, the campaign recycles the idea that all that is supposedly required to establish peace is a return to negotiations over diplomatic arrangements in the spirit of the Saudi monarchy’s plan. That is to say, the bottom line is a utopian idea of establishing regional peace on the foundation of Zionist nationalism, imperialist relations, capitalism, and monarchies — factors that block any horizon for genuine equality between peoples and for a resolution of the historic national-colonial conflict. It is worth recalling that general slogans declaring that ‘peace is the solution’ were also floated in the past by establishment parties. When Rabin in his time ruled out even the establishment of a Palestinian state and made it clear that the Palestinian Authority was ultimately intended to serve as a subcontractor for the occupation ‘without Supreme Court and without B’Tselem’, he recited that ‘there is only one radical solution to preserve human life… peace’. Yet the actual content of the policy he promoted was the perpetuation of the occupation and the settlements.
We shall assume, to be sure, that unlike Meretz, A Place for Us All will not join the World Zionist Organisation and will place far greater emphasis on a politics that cuts across national communities. Yet it is dangerous that the points of similarity with the politics of Meretz remain so striking. For Meretz was not a party of struggle to advance profound transformation of society; rather, it was a party designed to integrate into maintaining an order of capitalism and occupation, centered on an agenda seeking merely to soften their most brutal aspects under the guise of concern for democracy, human rights, and ‘social policy’.
The A Place for Us All list has barely been launched and is already making it clear that, since they are running ‘in order to influence’, they will ‘recommend the candidate with the best chances of forming an alternative government’ (without any condition), and that ‘we will want to be part of the alternative coalition that arises after Netanyahu… and ensure that the government that is formed advances the agenda for which we were elected: peace, equality, personal security, and social justice’. Meretz’s slogan in the 1992 elections was ‘a government with Meretz, the power to make the change’. This time, to be sure, there are no seats on the line in the current round, but the logic remains identical — in the absence of forces to construct a more left-wing government, all that remains is to help a capitalist government of occupation don a ‘social’ fig leaf.
It is impossible to square the circle. An Eisenkot or Bennett government will be a capitalist government of occupation and will not advance ‘peace, equality, personal security, and social justice’. There is no way to reconcile a consistent commitment to struggle against the occupation and the rule of capital with opportunistic participation in such a coalition government. This is not a question of sectarian ‘purism’. It is the ABCs of distinguishing between trailing behind one form or another of right-wing rule and building a consistent opposition from the left — an opposition grounded in the interests, struggles, and power of the working class in society around a vision for building the struggle for root-and-branch change.
Building an Independent Opposition on the Left
A socialist left necessarily rejects ‘pragmatic’ excuses for a dangerous shortsightedness that abandons the future. It is necessary to insist on telling the truth even when going against the stream, to raise warning flags, and, as noted, to pave the way for building an opposition on the left, around an agenda of socialist change, in the face of the incoming government — one that will inevitably disappoint those pinning hopes on it to advance ‘peace, equality, personal security, and social justice’.
An opposition on the left with a presence in the streets and in the Knesset will be able to utilise the platform of the Knesset as an amplifier for building struggles on the ground — to exert influence! — while exposing the conflict of interest with government policy and insisting on a political alternative. In this way, it will also be possible to further restrict the existing space for populist right-wing and far-right forces to swell in opposition under the guise of an alternative to the disastrous status quo.
The Socialist Struggle Movement is open to taking part in dialogue and discussion with other forces on the left regarding the challenges of the election campaign and the struggle to build a substantive political alternative — of a class-based socialist left — to right-wing rule.
For our part, we will emphasise that the need to prepare for building the opposition on the left against the next capitalist government of occupation is also linked to the need to advance steps towards building a broad party of struggle, cutting across national and ethnic communities, anchored in the working class. Such a party is also necessary to help pave the way for root-and-branch solutions by building power in society for a fundamental challenge to the occupation and the rule of capital, in pursuit of socialist change, as part of an international struggle. In particular, for a profound expansion of democracy, including equality between peoples — an end to occupation and national dispossession — and for public ownership of key resources and levers of power in the economy, in favour of democratic economic planning to eradicate poverty and inequality.
While we fully understand the sentiment of a broad public that will go out to vote in the hope of ridding itself of the capitalist government of death, we consider it to be a fundamental error for any organisations on the left and within organised labour to lend political support to any campaign or ballot paper promoting participation in the next capitalist government of occupation.
At this stage, it is possible that the Ḥadash/al-Jabha campaign — perhaps as part of the Joint List in some format — will be the only significant left-wing campaign at the national level that speaks to the need to put an end to Netanyahu’s rule, while also providing a horizon for building the opposition on the left in the Knesset, in the streets, in workplaces, and on campuses after the elections — even if it is still too early to judge the orientation and messaging line of the campaign, which has yet to take off. To the extent that the direction is towards building a combative left-wing campaign against the war, the occupation, the cost of living, and the rule of capital, for the strengthening of organised labour and workers’ struggles, and for the strengthening of women’s, LGBTQ+, and environmental struggles, we will be open to promoting dialogue, support, and cooperation, linked to educational and campaigning efforts around the necessity of advancing the construction of a socialist political alternative on a cross-community, class basis.
